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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent

:

v.

:

GERMAN CRUZ REYES

:

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner

Case No. 20040078-SC

:

INTRODUCTION
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner German Cruz Reyesfilesthis reply brief to correct
the State's misportrayal of the case law on requiring trial judges to instruct juries on the
law at the close of the evidence. Mr. Reyes' previously filed brief in this case and his
briefs in two companion appeals adequately address the State's arguments on the role of
and research supporting preliminary jury instructions, construing Utah Rule of Evidence
19, and the long-ingrained American tradition of instructing jurors at the end of the case.
See State v. Cruz. No. 20020735; State v. Weaver, No. 20030199. Nevertheless, Mr.
Reyes is compelled to respond to the State's erroneous characterizations that the cases
that the Court of Appeals and Mr. Reyes cite are either distinguishable or inapplicable.
To the contrary, each of those cases supports the Court of Appeals' plain language
interpretation of Utah's court rules and establish a due process right to instruct the jury
on the law at the close of the evidence.

ANALYSIS
MR. REYES1 CASES AGREE THAT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SIMILAR
COURT RULES REQUIRE TRIAL JUDGES
TO
REPEAT PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
LAW AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE
In its brief, the State contends that neither this Court's rules nor due process of
law requires trial judges to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the evidence. State's
Reply Brief and Brief on Cross-Review at 14-20 (hereinafter referred to as "State's
Brief1). To the contrary, every court that has addressed court rules similar to this Court's
has ruled that the plain language of those rules requires trial judges to repeat preliminary
jury instructions on the law at the end of the proceedings. Likewise, nearly all of these
courts have explicitly or impliedly ruled that due process of law requires jury instructions
on the law at the close of the evidence. Despite the State's best efforts to invite this
Court to doubt these conclusions, the State presents no contrary authority. Because due
process of law requires closing jury instructions, the Court of Appeals erred in applying a
simple harmless error standard to the trial judge's failure to repeat the preliminary jury
instructions on the law.
A,

Case Law Supports the Court of Appeals'
Plain Language Review of Utah's Court
Rules,

In every relevant respect, each of the cases that Mr. Reyes has cited on appeal
requires instructing the jury on the law at the close of the evidence. First of all, the State
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does not dispute that all of Mr. Reyes9 authorities construed court rules similar to Utah's.
State's Brief at 16. Nor, does the State contend that those courts held that the plain
language of their rules required trial judges to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the
evidence. Id
Second, the State erroneously contends that "none" of Mr. Reyes' citations address
court rules or statutes that allow trial judges to instruct jurors at the beginning of trial or at
"'any other appropriate time'" as does Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6). IdL To
the contrary, the principal jurisdictions upon which Mr. Reyes relies similarly allow trial
judges to give jurors preliminary instructions at the beginning of the trial and/or instruct
jurors throughout the proceedings. The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, construed its
rules as requiring closing instructions on the law even though its rules allowed judges to
instruct the jury at any time during trial. State v. Comen, 553 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ohio
1990). Similar to Rule 17(g)(6), Ohio's rules provide that "'[a]t the commencement and
during the course of the trial, the court may give cautionary and other instructions of law
relating to trial procedure, credibility and weight of the evidence, and the duty and
function of the jury and may acquaint the jury generally with the nature of the case.'" Id.
(quoting Ohio R. Crim. P. 30(B)). This rule is as equally broad as Utah's rules that allow
instructions at any time.
Likewise, in State v. Nelson. 587 N.W.2d 439,443-44 (S.D. 1998), the South
Dakota Supreme Court required trial judges to repeat preliminary instructions at the close
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of the case even though a statute provided for preliminary jury instructions. The statute in
that case gave trial judges discretion to "'give general and preliminary instructions to the
jury on the conduct of the trial but not on substantive issues'" after the jury is sworn but
before opening statements. (Quoting S.D.C.L. § 15-6-51(a)). Prior to deciding Nelson ,
the South Dakota Supreme Court had interpreted this rule as allowing judges to instruct
jurors on "their 'function, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof and other
preliminary matters aimed at making the trial more understandable.'" IcL at 444 (quoting
State v. Eagle Star, 558 N.W.2d 70, |20 (S.D. 1996). That court apparently did not view
the ban on preliminary instructions addressing "substantive issues" as barring such
instructions. Despite this discretion to give preliminary jury instructions, that court held
that due of process of law and the plain language of the applicable statutes required
repeating preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence. Id. at 444-45.
Several other cases have reached the same conclusion. The Arizona Supreme
Court interpreted its court rules as plainly requiring instructions on the law at the close of
the evidence. State v. Jackson, 695 P.2d 742, 743 (Ariz. 1985). That court reached this
conclusion despite a court rule that mandated that "'[immediately after the jury is sworn,
the court shall instruct the jury concerning its duties, its conduct, the order of proceedings,
and the elementary legal principles that will govern the proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 18.6(c)). Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently required closing
jury instructions on the law in the face of a similar court rule that allowed for preliminary
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instructions that would aid "'the jury in comprehending the trial procedures and sequence
to be followed.5" State v. Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.03, subdv. 4). The Peterson court reached this conclusion even though the
court rule specifically provided that trial judges need not repeat preliminary jury
instructions at the close of the evidence. Id. at n.4.
The State further misses the mark because Mr. Reyes' remaining cases do not even
suggest a different result. Rather, both cases simply do not discuss whether those
jurisdictions allow for preliminary or mid-trial instructions. Bennett v. State, 789 W.2d
436, 438-39 (Ark. 1990); Little v. State, 498 S.E.2d 284, 287 (Ga. Ct App. 1998). More
importantly, both of these cases construe similar court rules to Utah's that mandate trial
judges to give jurors closing instructions on the law. Bennett, 789 W.2d at 438-39; Little,
498 S.E.2d at 287. Consistent with the Court of Appeals' decision below, both of these
cases specifically hold that the plain language of their court rules require instructing jurors
on the law at the close of the evidence. Bennett, 789 W.2d at 438-39; Little, 498 S.E.2d
at 287. In any event, both courts encourage giving jurors preliminary and mid-trial
instructions to improve juror performance and comprehension. Bennett, 789 W.2d at
438-39; Little, 498 S.E.2d at 287. Thus, the State assumes too much in claiming that
these cases fail to address court rules similar to Utah's.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) and 19(g) are indistinguishable from
the rules that these cases construed. Like the rules and statutes in those cases, Rule
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17(g)(6) (emphasis added) mandates that "[w]hen the e\ tence is concluded and at any
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury.. .." Similarly, Rule 19(g)
(emphasis added) directs that "[arguments of the respective parties shall be made after
the court has given the jury its final instructions." Just as Mr. Reyes' cases hold, these
rules require trial judges to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the evidence even
though judges also have discretion to instruct the jury at the beginning of or during trial.

B.

In Depicting the Case Law on Requiring
Judges to Instruct Jurors on the Law at the
Close of the Evidence, The State Omits the Due
Process Foundation of Those Cases.

Third, even if these cases did not support Mr. Reyes' plain language analysis, they
establish a due process right to fully instruct the jury at the close of the evidence.
Contrary to the State's brief description of these cases, each of the cases that Mr. Reyes
cites either expressly or implicitly establishes a due process right to give the jury closing
instructions on the law. In the majority of the cases, courts have required closing jury
instructions while specifically relying on state and federal due process rights to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the State shouldering the
burden of proof. State v. Woolcock, 518 A.2d 1377, 1387 (Conn. 1986); Little, 498
S.E.2d at 287; Peterson, 673 N.W.2d at 486; People v. Newman, 385 N.E.2d 598, 599
(N.Y. 1978); Nelson, 587 N.W.2d at 445. Other cases allude to due process rights in
requiring trial judges to repeat preliminary jury instructions on "vital", "elementary" or
6

"fundamental" rights. Jackson, 695 P.2d at 743; State v. Marquez, 660 P.2d 1243,1249
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)); Comen. 553 N.E.2d at 644. Whether specifically or impliedly, all
of these cases founded their decisions on due process principles.
The State further errs in its individual depiction of these cases as not based on due
process rights. State's Brief at 19-20. For example, the State describes Nelson as
requiring reversal only because "cumulative errors" merely constituted the denial of
"substantial rights," including the "statutory" right to instruct jurors at the close of the
evidence. Id, at 19. But, the State fails to mention that these conclusions only arose
because the defendant failed to object to the lack of closing instructions which forced the
court to review the constitutional violation for plain error. Nelson, 587 N.W.2d at 443,
446-47. Before reaching these conclusions, the Nelson court extensively discussed
defendants' basic due process rights. Id. at 445. It then specifically ruled that the failure
to instruct the jury following the presentation of the evidence deprived the defendant of
the due process right to a "fair trial." Id. The discussion of cumulative error and
substantial rights was only necessary because the third prong of that court's plain error
test required defendants to show the denial of "substantial rights." IdL at 443. The Nelson
court eliminated any doubt about the constitutional basis for its decision in its ultimate
conclusions that the lack of instructions constituted a "disregard for fundamental trial
procedures" that were necessary to ensure that the jury's verdict was "reliable." Id. at 447.
Likewise, the State erroneously dismisses the Georgia Court of Appeals' decision
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in Little as merely stating the "incontrovertible proposition" that failing to instruct juries
on fundamental due process rights violates state and federal constitutional protections.
State's Brief at 19. Again, the State omits that court's explicit ruling that failing to give
jurors closing instructions on the law violated due process principles:
The presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and
the standard of proof are the fundamental doctrines of American
criminal jurisprudence and the bedrock of determining guilt or
innocence in a criminal case. The failure of the trial court to
give such charges would be a violation of the defendant's state
and federal constitutional due process rights.
498 S.E.2d at 287. Eliminating any possible doubt about the constitutional basis for its
ruling, Little held that f,[t]he failure of the trial court... to recharge on the presumption of
innocence and burden of proof was a state and federal constitutional due process
violation." kLat288n.l.
The State similarly fails to disclose the due-process based reasoning in Woolcock,
518 A.2d 1377. The defendant there contended that preliminary jury instructions violated
his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Id, at 1385. The Connecticut Supreme
Court agreed with commentators, researchers, and scholars that support granting trial
judges discretion to give preliminary jury instructions "so long as the jury is again fully
instructed at the close of the proceedings." Id. at 1387. Because the central question in
Woolcock was the constitutionality of instructing jurors before the end of the case, the
court's decision to condition such instructions on trial judges' repeating the instructions at
the end of the case means, by definition, that the decision is constitutionally based.
8

Similarly relying on due process requirements, the decision in Newman, 385
N.E.2d at 599, specifically invoked "the fundamental nature of the constitutional precept
that each essential element of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Likewise, in Comen, 553 N.E.2d at 644, the Ohio Supreme Court required trial judges to
repeat preliminary instructions on "matters of law vital to the rights of a defendant." In
any event, even if Comen could be read as based on nonconstitutional grounds, the Ohio
Court of Appeals later criticized such a reading. In State v. Owens, 632 N.E.2d 1301,
1305-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), that court disagreed with Comen 's application of a simple
harmless error analysis because it ruled that failing to re-instruct the jury at the close of
the evidence constituted "'federal constitutional error.'" IjL_ (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
The State's remaining arguments fail because Mr. Reyes' citations implicitly but
plainly rely on due process grounds in requiring trial judges to repeat preliminary jury
instructions on the law. Although the State correctly observes that the decision in
Bennett, 789 S.W.2d 436, does not appear to be constitutionally based, the court in that
case rested its decision, in part, on the due-process type concern that instructing different
juries on the law at different times would arbitrarily result in "changes in verdicts." Id. at
439. It is axiomatic that due process encompasses the procedural right to be free from the
arbitrary or irrational denial of liberty. See, e.g., Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512
(Utah 1994) (right to procedural due process in parole proceedings); State v. Bell, 754
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P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988) (right to procedural due process in sentencing). Based on this
concern, the court ruled that "[n]o person should have his [or her] liberty judged under
such circumstances." Bennett, 789 S.W.2d at 439. Thus, all of Mr. Reyes' citations either
explicitly base their decisions on due process requirements or phrase their holdings in due
process terms.

C.

AH of the Applicable Cases Require The State
to Show that the Trial Court's Failure to
Repeat the Preliminary Jury Instructions Was
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Finally, the State mischaracterizes Mr. Reyes' cases on harmless error review.
Numerous courts have implicitly found due process violations for the failure to instruct
jurors at the end of the evidence because they review such failings under the
constitutionally-required harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. S tate v.
Romanoskv. 859 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz. 1993)); Little, 498 S.E.2d at 287; Owens. 632
N.E.2d at 1306. In fact, the State incorrectly implies that both the Georgia and Ohio
Supreme Courts have rejected a due process analysis because they have reviewed failures
to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the evidence for simple harmlessness. State's
Brief at 21-22 (citing Griffith v. State. 444 S.E.2d 794, 795-96 (Ga. 1994) and Comen,
553 N.E.2d at 644). Like its other omissions, the State fails to disclose that the Georgia
and Ohio Courts of Appeals specifically discounted the harmless error analyses in Griffith
and Comen. See Little, 498 S.E.2d at 287; Owens, 632 N.E.2d at 1306. Both courts
10

rejected their supreme courts' analyses and ruled that failing to instruct jurors on the law
at the end of the case constituted federal constitutional violations that required the State to
show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Little. 498 S.E.2d at 287; Owens, 632
N.E.2datl306.
In sum, all of Mr. Reyes' citations support his plain language analysis of Rules
17(g)(6) and 19(g) and his constitutional right to instruct jurors on the law at the close of
the evidence. The State cites no cases to contradict these conclusions. Thus, the only
question for this Court is whether the failure to so instruct the jury constitutes structural
error or, instead, requires the State to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Peterson. 673 N.W.2d at 486; Romanoskv. 859 P.2d at 744. As explained in Mr. Reyes'
brief on cross-certiorari review, he prevails under either standard as well as under the
cumulative error doctrine. Appellant's Brief at 44-48.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the briefs in this and the other two
companion cases, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial judge violated Utah
law in refusing to repeat the preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence.
Further, because that error violated basic due process protections, Mr. Reyes is entitled to
a new trial both as a matter of law and because the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt in this credibility contest.
Submitted, this /a*t day of November, 2004.

-sz£^
KEtfT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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